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ACTUAL INNOCENCE IN NEW YORK:   
THE CURIOUS CASE OF PEOPLE V. HAMILTON 
Benjamin E. Rosenberg* 
 
It is rare for a case from the New York Appellate Division to be as 
significant as People v. Hamilton.1  The case, however, was the first New 
York appellate court decision to hold that a defendant might vacate his 
conviction if he could demonstrate that he was “actually innocent” of the 
crime of which he was charged.  Although the precedential force of the 
decision is limited to the Second Department, trial courts throughout the 
state are required to follow Hamilton unless or until the appellate court in 
their own Department rules on the issue.2  Courts throughout the state are 
thus entertaining numerous “actual innocence” motions inspired by 
Hamilton. 
While courts in some other states, including state appellate courts, have 
recognized actual innocence claims,3 whether such claims should be 
recognized, and if so under what circumstances, is a very live issue in the 
federal courts and numerous state courts throughout the country.  
Examination of Hamilton, therefore, provides a useful way to consider 
issues that are of surpassing importance in criminal law and that will likely 
reoccur in cases throughout the country.  As Hamilton goes further than 
many other courts have in considering the implications of actual innocence 
claims, consideration of Hamilton may be of considerable value to courts 
that consider actual innocence claims.  Hamilton is a trailblazer, and its trail 
will repay careful study. 
I.   BACKGROUND 
Before considering Hamilton itself, it is appropriate to consider briefly 
both New York’s collateral relief statute and the types of “actual 
innocence” claims that might be asserted. 
 
*  General Counsel, District Attorney of New York.  The views expressed in this Article are 
the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the views of the District Attorney’s Office. 
 
 
 1. 979 N.Y.S.2d 97 (App. Div. 2014). 
 2. See People v. Turner, 840 N.E.2d 123, 127 (N.Y. 2005); Mountain View Coach 
Lines v. Storms, 476 N.Y.S.2d 918, 920 (App. Div. 1984) (“[T]he doctrine of stare decisis 
requires trial courts in this department to follow precedents set by the Appellate Division of 
another department until the Court of Appeals or this court pronounces a contrary rule.” 
(citations omitted)). 
 3. See infra notes 54–72 and accompanying text (discussing authority relied on by 
Hamilton). 
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A.   New York’s Collateral Relief Statute, CPL Section 440.10 
Section 440.10 of New York’s Criminal Procedural Law (CPL), like its 
federal counterparts, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254 and 2255, sets forth certain grounds 
on which a convicted defendant may collaterally attack her conviction.  
Most of the grounds are well articulated and relatively narrow.  Section 
440.10(1)(a), for example, permits a collateral attack if it can be shown that 
the court in which the defendant was convicted did not have jurisdiction.4  
Other sections provide for collateral attack if the judgment of conviction 
was obtained by duress or fraud,5 if the prosecutor presented material 
evidence at the trial that he knew to be false,6 or if material evidence 
presented at the trial was “procured in violation of the defendant’s” 
constitutional rights.7 
Of particular importance to an evaluation of Hamilton is section 
440.10(1)(g), which provides that a convicted defendant may collaterally 
attack her conviction on the ground that she has discovered powerful 
evidence that if known to the jury would likely have affected the outcome, 
and that could not have been discovered earlier even if the defendant had 
exercised due diligence.8  Claims under this section are colloquially known 
as “newly discovered evidence” claims. 
Section 440.10(1)(h) is also especially important for Hamilton.  That 
section provides that a defendant may seek vacatur of her conviction if it is 
established that the defendant’s judgment of conviction “was obtained in 
violation of a right of the defendant under the [New York or federal 
constitutions].”9  Until last year, that section had been used to challenge 
convictions where a defendant’s right to, for example, adequate counsel,10 
or the disclosure of exculpatory information,11 had allegedly been violated.  
It thus complemented CPL section 440.10(1)(d), which, as noted above, 
addressed constitutional defects that led to particular evidence being 
adduced at a trial.12  Section 440.10(1)(h) addressed constitutional defects 
that affected the trial but were not tied to particular pieces of evidence at the 
trial.  As seen below, Hamilton vastly expanded the scope of section 
440.10(1)(h). 
In addition to the grounds for relief, section 440.10 also sets forth certain 
procedural requirements for collateral attack.  Section 440.10(2) provides 
that the court must deny a collateral attack if the issue raised had been 
raised and rejected on the direct appeal of the conviction, if the appeal was 
pending and might decide the issue, or if the defendant failed to raise the 
 
 4. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.10(1)(a) (McKinney 2005). 
 5. See id. § 440.10(1)(b). 
 6. See id. § 440.10(1)(c). 
 7. See id. § 440.10(1)(d).  The statute specifies other grounds for collateral attack, see 
generally id. § 440.10(1)(e), (f), (g-1) & (i), but they are not relevant to this Article. 
 8. See id. § 440.10(1)(g). 
 9. See id. § 440.10(1)(h). 
 10. See, e.g., People v. Becoats, 984 N.Y.S.2d 720, 721 (App. Div. 2014). 
 11. See, e.g., People v. Williams, 854 N.Y.S.2d 586, 589 (App. Div. 2008). 
 12. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
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issue on his direct appeal, although he might have done so.13  Section 
440.10(3) provides that the court may deny collateral relief if the defendant 
could have raised the issue—either prior to his sentence or in a previous 
collateral attack—but failed to do so,14 or if he did raise the issue in a prior 
state or federal collateral attack, but the earlier court denied the claim.15  
Section 440.10(3) notes, however, that even if any of the circumstances 
allowing for (but not requiring) dismissal of the collateral motion are 
present, the court may still grant the collateral motion “in the interest of 
justice and for good cause shown” in the exercise of its discretion, if the 
motion is “otherwise meritorious.”16 
B.   Actual Innocence, Freestanding Claims, and “Gateway Claims” 
The intuitive idea of “actual innocence” is clear enough.  A defendant 
who claims he is “actually innocent” is asserting, in simplest possible terms, 
that he did not do what he was convicted of doing.  It is not simply that the 
evidence against him was insufficient for a jury to conclude beyond a 
reasonable doubt that he committed the crime of conviction.  Nor is it that 
his rights were somehow violated by the government in the course of its 
prosecution of him.  The defendant who would assert a claim of actual 
innocence is asserting, “I didn’t do it.” 
It is worth pausing to note that however simple and straightforward such 
an assertion appears to be, it is, in fact, more complicated.  There is a 
question about what the “it” is:  Is the argument “I was not part of the 
conspiracy of which I was convicted (although I may have been part of 
another conspiracy)” a claim of actual innocence?  Even though courts have 
repeatedly said that claims of actual innocence are not claims of insufficient 
evidence,17 it is not entirely clear what the difference is.  We never know 
what happened in any particular instance; we draw conclusions based on the 
evidence that we have.18  At bottom, therefore, a claim of actual innocence 
is a claim about evidence.  If it is not that the evidence at trial was 
insufficient to convict, it is that other evidence establishes—by some 
standard—that the defendant is in fact innocent. 
There are two categories of actual innocence claims, gateway claims and 
freestanding claims.19  Gateway claims work as follows:  a defendant 
makes a showing that he is “actually innocent,” and, if he satisfies the 
burden of making such a showing, is permitted to proceed to assert a claim 
for collateral relief even if he would otherwise be procedurally barred from 
 
 13. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.10(2)(a)–(c). 
 14. See id. § 440.10(3)(a), (c). 
 15. See id. § 440.10(3)(b). 
 16. See id. § 440.10(3). 
 17. See, e.g., Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 623 (1998) (“‘[A]ctual innocence’ 
means factual innocence, not mere legal insufficiency.” (citation omitted)). 
 18. Poventud v. City of New York, 750 F.3d 121, 143 (2d Cir. 2014) (en banc) (Lynch, 
J., concurring). 
 19. See generally Andre Mathis, A Critical Analysis of Actual Innocence After House v. 
Bell:  Has the Riddle of Actual Innocence Finally Been Solved?, 37 U. MEM. L. REV. 813, 
819–23 (2007). 
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doing so.  To obtain such relief, however, he must still establish that there 
was some violation of his rights at trial that would, if there were no 
procedural barriers, entitle him to such relief.  Thus, it is not the defendant’s 
actual innocence that entitles him to relief but the underlying violation.  The 
showing of actual innocence merely allows the defendant to advance his 
case under circumstances where he would otherwise be procedurally 
barred.20 
Thus, a defendant might succeed in his gateway claim insofar as he is 
able to convince a court to consider whether his underlying conviction was 
marred by a constitutional defect, whereas, had he not made a gateway 
claim of actual innocence, he might not have been able to get the court to 
consider the argument.  His petition might still be denied, however, because 
even if he is “actually innocent” there may have been no defect in his 
underlying conviction.  Such a situation would obtain, for example, where a 
defendant, advised by fully competent counsel, knowingly and intelligently 
waives his right to trial and pleads guilty, and only later discovers that there 
was an alibi witness unknown to him at the time of his plea who could not 
have been discovered by him or anyone else at that time, even after diligent 
effort.  There having been no defect in the underlying proceeding, the 
defendant’s petition would be denied, even though he is or may be “actually 
innocent.” 
Freestanding claims are simpler to understand than gateway claims.  A 
defendant who asserts a freestanding claim asserts simply:  regardless of the 
presence or absence of errors at my underlying trial, I have a claim of 
innocence and should therefore be released from any criminal sanction or 
process.  That means that even if the underlying trial was perfect—
sufficient evidence, competent counsel, no violation of the defendant’s 
rights—the defendant would be entitled to relief if he could show that he 
was, in fact, actually innocent. 
II.   PEOPLE V. HAMILTON 
The defendant was convicted in 1993 of a 1991 murder.  The key witness 
against the defendant was the victim’s girlfriend and, although the 
defendant submitted a notice of alibi, naming two witnesses who claimed 
he was in New Haven, Connecticut at the time of the crime, neither testified 
at the defendant’s trial.21  One claimed to be too ill to testify, the other too 
frightened.22  The defendant made a number of post-verdict and CPL 
section 440 motions.  In one of them, he represented that the key 
prosecution witness had recanted her testimony, and he sought to introduce 
the testimony of his two additional alibi witnesses, allegedly unavailable at 
the time of his trial.23 
 
 20. See, e.g., McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 S. Ct. 1924, 1931 (2013) (“[A] credible 
showing of actual innocence may allow a prisoner to pursue his constitutional claims . . . on 
the merits notwithstanding the existence of a procedural bar to relief.”). 
 21. People v. Hamilton, 979 N.Y.S.2d 97, 100 (App. Div. 2014). 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
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The hearing court denied the defendant’s motion and refused to hear the 
testimony of the new alibi witnesses.  Most significantly, the hearing court 
held that “the affidavits of these witnesses, and their proposed testimony, 
did not constitute newly discovered evidence [CPL section 440.10(1)(g)], 
because the defendant had failed to establish that they could not have been 
located in time to testify at trial with the exercise of due diligence.”24 
Thirteen years later, the defendant moved again to vacate his conviction, 
this time arguing that “evidence of his alibi established his actual 
innocence.”25  He further argued that a “free-standing actual innocence 
claim exists separate and apart from a claim of newly discovered 
evidence,”26 and that the claim had to be considered even if the evidence 
allegedly establishing actual innocence was not newly discovered.27  The 
hearing court denied the defendant’s motion,28 and he appealed. 
The Appellate Division reversed.  The court first ruled that the 
mandatory procedural bars of CPL section 440.10(2)(a) and (c)—which 
provide, in substance, that a court hearing a collateral attack pursuant to 
CPL section 440.10, must deny any claim that has been or could have been 
raised on direct appeal—applied to claims of actual innocence generally, 
but it did not apply to Hamilton’s case because Hamilton had not raised a 
claim of actual innocence on direct review “and the facts underlying his 
current claims did not appear in the record on direct appeal.”29 
The court further noted that Hamilton had raised his claim of actual 
innocence in prior CPL section 440.10 motions, and therefore the trial court 
had the discretion, pursuant to CPL section 440.10(3)(b) and (c) to deny the 
motion.30  Noting the discretionary nature of these bars, however, the court 
summarily ruled that “there is no reason why the courts may not consider a 
credible claim of actual innocence in the exercise of discretion.”31 
Drawing the distinction between gateway claims and freestanding 
claims,32 the court focused its attention on the latter.33  The court turned to 
federal cases and concluded that while “[t]he [f]ederal courts have not 
resolved whether a prisoner may be entitled to habeas corpus relief based 
upon a freestanding claim of actual innocence,”34 the U.S. Supreme Court 
“has recognized that ‘a credible showing of actual innocence may allow a 
prisoner to pursue . . . constitutional claims . . . on the merits 
notwithstanding the existence of a procedural bar to relief.’”35 
 
 24. Id. at 101. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. at 102 (quoting from the affirmation submitted by defendant’s counsel). 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. at 103–04; see also supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
 30. Id. at 104; see also supra notes 14–15 and accompanying text. 
 31. Id. at 104. 
 32. See supra note 19 and accompanying text (discussing distinction between gateway 
and freestanding claims). 
 33. Hamilton, 979 N.Y.S.2d at 104–05. 
 34. Id. at 104. 
 35. Id. at 105 (quoting McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 S. Ct. 1924, 1931 (2013)). 
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The Hamilton court termed this the “fundamental miscarriage of justice 
exception” to the procedural limitations on habeas relief.36   The court 
noted, however, that the exception was limited to (1) “cases where the 
petition is based on a retroactive change of constitutional law,” or to 
(2) cases in which  
“the factual predicate for the claim could not have been discovered 
previously through the exercise of due diligence,” and “the facts 
underlying the claim, if proven and viewed in the light of the evidence as 
a whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence 
that, but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have 
found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense.”37 
Continuing to survey federal law, the court observed that “‘actual 
innocence’ means factual innocence, not mere legal insufficiency of 
evidence of guilt, and must be based upon reliable evidence which was not 
presented at trial.”38  It further noted that “[t]he standard of proof generally 
applied is proof of actual innocence by clear and convincing evidence,”39 
and that “in ‘light of the new evidence, no juror, acting reasonably, would 
have voted [the defendant] guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’”40 
After surveying briefly the laws of other states,41 the court finally 
considered the law of New York, noting that no appellate court had 
considered whether to recognize “a freestanding claim of actual innocence,” 
although some trial courts had recognized the claim.42  The court then made 
a series of rulings with broad significance. 
First, the court held that “where the defendant asserts a claim of actual 
innocence, new evidence may be considered whether or not” it satisfies the 
requirements for “newly discovered evidence” (CPL section 440.10(g)) and 
“other legal barriers, such as prior adverse court determinations, which 
might otherwise bar further recourse to the courts.”43 
Second, the conviction of one who was “actually innocent” violated the 
due process clause of the state and federal constitutions because “a person 
who has not committed any crime has a liberty interest in remaining free 
from punishment.”44  The punishment of such a person, the court held, also 
violates the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the New York 
Constitution.45  Therefore, the court held, the claim was cognizable under 
CPL section 440.10(1)(h), which allows for collateral relief from 
 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)). 
 38. Id. (citing Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 623–24 (1998); Schlup, 513 U.S. 
at 324). 
 39. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244(b)(2), 2254(e)(2)). 
 40. Id. (quoting McQuiggin, 133 S. Ct. at 1928). 
 41. The Hamilton court’s discussion of state and federal authority is further discussed 
below.  See infra notes 54–72 and accompanying text. 
 42. Hamilton, 979 N.Y.S.2d at 107–08. 
 43. Id. at 107 (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 108. 
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convictions “obtained in violation of a right of the defendant under the 
[New York or federal constitutions].”46 
Third, the defendant must establish his actual innocence by “clear and 
convincing evidence.”47  The court explained that “[m]ere doubt as to the 
defendant’s guilt, or a preponderance of conflicting evidence as to the 
defendant’s guilt, is insufficient, since a convicted defendant no longer 
enjoys a presumption of innocence, and in fact is presumed to be guilty.”48 
Fourth, a defendant who makes a “prima facie showing” of actual 
innocence is entitled to a hearing to allow him to make his showing by clear 
and convincing evidence.49  The court defined a “prima facie showing,” as 
“a sufficient showing of possible merit to warrant a further exploration.”50  
The court held that the defendant had made such a showing because he had 
credibly alleged an alibi and the main witness against him had recanted her 
testimony and claimed that her testimony had been manipulated in the first 
place.51 
Fifth, at the hearing, “all reliable evidence, including evidence not 
admissible at trial based upon a procedural bar . . . should be admitted.”52 
Sixth, the remedy, if the defendant establishes his innocence by clear and 
convincing evidence, is dismissal of the indictment.  “There is no need to 
empanel another jury to consider the defendant’s guilt where the trial court 
has determined, after a hearing, that no juror, acting reasonably, would find 
the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”53 
The court remanded the case for a hearing on the defendant’s “actual 
innocence.”  As of the time of this writing, the hearing has not started. 
III.   QUESTIONS IN HAMILTON’S WAKE 
To say that Hamilton leaves unresolved questions in its wake is not to 
criticize it.  Every important case, right or wrong, raises questions of 
application and interpretation.  A list of some such questions follows. 
A.   Does Hamilton Go Beyond Precedent? 
Hamilton correctly notes that under federal law a claim of actual 
innocence serves as a “gateway claim,” but it is not clear that actual 
innocence is itself a ground on which collateral relief may be afforded under 
federal law.  That is, once a petitioner establishes “actual innocence” he 
must still establish some other constitutional violation—often ineffective 
 
 46. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.10(1)(h) (McKinney 2005). 
 47. Hamilton, 979 N.Y.S.2d at 108. 
 48. Id. (citing Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 314 n.42 (1995); Herrera v. Collins, 506 
U.S. 390, 398 (1993)). 
 49. Id. at 108–09. 
 50. Id. at 108 (citing Goldblum v. Klem, 510 F.3d 204, 219 (3d Cir. 2007)). 
 51. Id. at 108–09. 
 52. Id. at 109 (citing People v. Cole, 765 N.Y.S.2d 477, 486 (Sup. Ct. 2003); Schlup, 
513 U.S. at 328). 
 53. See id. (“[I]f the defendant prevails on his claim of actual innocence, a new trial 
would not be necessary.”). 
8 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW RES GESTAE [Vol. 83 
assistance of counsel.54  Under federal law, a claim of actual innocence is 
not a “freestanding claim,” such that once one establishes actual 
innocence—to whatever standard of proof—one is entitled to collateral 
relief.  The court in Hamilton clearly goes beyond the federal cases. 
Although Hamilton does not discuss it, there is, in fact, a very good 
reason that a state court might recognize a freestanding claim of actual 
innocence more readily than would a federal court, at least where such 
claims arise out of state criminal prosecutions.  In considering collateral 
attacks on state criminal convictions, federal courts, unlike state courts, 
must consider the limits imposed by federalism.  As the U.S. Supreme 
Court explained in Herrera v. Collins, “‘[f]ederal courts are not forums in 
which to relitigate state trials.’”55  Thus, that Hamilton goes beyond federal 
authority may be explained by the different stances and considerations of 
federal and state courts in considering collateral relief for state criminal 
convictions. 
The court in Hamilton stated that “[a] number of states have recognized a 
freestanding claim of actual innocence, some by statute with specific 
limitations, and some by case law with less specific limitations.”56  
Examination of the statutes that Hamilton cited shows, however, that the 
“specific limitations” are quite significant.  Several of the statutes limit 
actual innocence to claims that are based on scientific evidence, some 
specifically referring to DNA.57  Others limit such claims to those based on 
newly discovered evidence.58  These are not strong support for Hamilton’s 
recognition of a broad, freestanding, actual innocence claim that might be 
based on evidence that is neither scientific nor newly discovered.59 
Hamilton’s reliance on cases from other states is similarly open to 
question: 
• Hamilton cites the California Supreme Court case In re Bell in support 
of the proposition that “[a] number of states have recognized a 
freestanding claim of actual innocence . . . by case law,”60 yet Bell 
expressly states that it is not relying on or recognizing a claim of actual 
innocence.61 
 
 54. McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 S. Ct. 1924, 1931 (2013). 
 55. 506 U.S. 390, 401 (1993) (quoting Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 887 (1983)). 
 56. Hamilton, 979 N.Y.S.2d at 106 (footnotes omitted). 
 57. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-112-201 (2006) (requiring “scientific evidence”); 
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4504 (2007) (requiring DNA evidence); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 15, 
§ 2138(10) (Supp. 2013) (requiring DNA evidence); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2953.21 
(LexisNexis 2010) (requiring DNA evidence); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-30-117(a)(2) (2012) 
(requiring “new scientific evidence”); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-9-301 (LexisNexis 2012) 
(requiring DNA evidence). 
 58. See MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 8-301 (LexisNexis Supp. 2013) (requires newly 
discovered evidence); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-327.11 (Supp. 2013) (requires “previously 
unknown or unavailable evidence”). 
 59. But see ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 32.1(h) (2011) (codifying a broad freestanding actual 
innocence claim). 
 60. Hamilton, 979 N.Y.S.2d at 106. 
 61. In re Bell, 170 P.3d 153, 157 n.2 (Cal. 2007) (“Although we have not yet recognized 
on habeas corpus a claim of actual innocence untethered to any newly discovered evidence, 
2014] THE CURIOUS CASE OF PEOPLE V. HAMILTON 9 
• Hamilton also relies on authority from Connecticut for this 
proposition,62 even though, as Hamilton acknowledges, the most recent 
authority from Connecticut indicates that it is not clear that Connecticut 
recognizes a freestanding claim of actual innocence.63 
• Another of the cases cited by Hamilton as recognizing a freestanding 
claim of actual innocence, Illinois v. Washington,64 gave relief to the 
defendant, but only where the evidence establishing innocence was newly 
discovered:  “We therefore hold as a matter of Illinois constitutional 
jurisprudence that a claim of newly discovered evidence showing a 
defendant to be actually innocent of the crime for which he was convicted 
is cognizable as a matter of due process.”65  Thus, Washington does not 
provide support for the proposition that Illinois supports an actual 
innocence claim simpliciter, but only that it would recognize such a claim 
based on newly discovered evidence that was not available to the 
defendant at the time of the original trial. 
• Montoya v. Ulibarri,66 a New Mexico Supreme Court decision, 
recognized a claim of actual innocence, as did Amrine v. Roper,67 a 
Missouri Supreme Court decision, and Montana v. Beach,68 a Montana 
Supreme Court decision.  Montoya expressly stated that the evidence 
establishing actual innocence did not have to be newly discovered,69 
while Amrine did not address the issue.  Montoya is thus probably the out-
of-state case that most strongly supports Hamilton. 
Notably, in most of these cases, the remedy contemplated by the courts if 
the defendant prevailed was a new trial.70  Only Montana v. Beach found 
that the defendant was entitled to be set free if he prevailed on his actual 
innocence motion.71  Once again, Hamilton seems to have exceeded most of 
the authority on which it relied. 
Finally, Hamilton also fundamentally expands the interpretation of CPL 
section 440.10(1)(h).  That section had allowed for collateral relief when it 
could be shown that a defendant’s constitutional rights at trial were 
 
we need not decide here whether such a claim would lie, inasmuch as petitioner’s claim does 
rely on newly discovered evidence . . . .” (first emphasis added)). 
 62. See Hamilton, 979 N.Y.S.2d at 106 & n.3 (citing Gould v. Comm’r of Corr., 22 A.3d 
1196 (Conn. 2011); Miller v. Comm’r of Corr., 700 A.2d 1108 (Conn. 1997); Summerville 
v. Warden, 641 A.2d 1356 (Conn. 1994)). 
 63. See id. at 106 (citing Gould, 22 A.3d at 1200 n.8). 
 64. 665 N.E.2d 1330 (Ill. 1996). 
 65. Id. at 1337. 
 66. 163 P.3d 476 (N.M. 2007). 
 67. 102 S.W.3d 541 (Mo. 2003). 
 68. 302 P.3d 47 (Mont. 2013). 
 69. See Montoya, 163 P.3d at 487. 
 70. See Gould v. Comm’r of Corr., 22 A.3d 1196 (Conn. 2011); see also Washington, 
665 N.E.2d at 478; id. at 490 (McMorrow, J., concurring); Amrine, 102 S.W.3d at 549.  In 
Montoya v. Ulibarri and In re Bell, the New Mexico and California Supreme Courts, 
respectively, found that the defendants had not met the burden of proof to establish actual 
innocence, and so the courts did not reach the issue of determining the appropriate remedy. 
See In re Bell, 170 P.3d 153, 157 n.2 (Cal. 2007); Montoya, 163 P.3d at 487–88. 
 71. Beach, 302 P.3d at 54 (stating that if a petitioner succeeds on a freestanding actual 
innocence claim, then “the petitioner is forever exonerated”; the case went on to hold, 
however, that the petitioner before the court had failed to prove his freestanding claim). 
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violated.72  Hamilton provides that a conviction following a trial that is 
absolutely without procedural or other error may nevertheless be 
collaterally attacked (indeed, vacated and the indictment dismissed) upon a 
showing of actual innocence because, according to Hamilton, the result of 
the error-free trial is itself a due process violation. 
B.   What Evidence Will Be Admissible 
at an “Actual Innocence” Hearing? 
Hamilton held that at an “actual innocence” hearing the court should 
consider “all reliable evidence, including evidence not admissible at trial 
based upon a procedural bar.”73  To what “procedural bars” is the court 
referring?  Consider a statement by a non-testifying codefendant that tends 
to exculpate the defendant, and that the defendant claims should be 
admitted pursuant to the statement against penal interest exception to the 
rule against hearsay.  Suppose further that the original trial court ruled that 
the statement was not a statement against penal interest.  Is that ruling a 
“procedural bar”?  The same question applies for almost any testimony or 
document that the defendant in the original trial unsuccessfully sought to 
introduce into evidence:  Was the trial court’s ruling—on grounds of 
hearsay, inauthenticity, undue prejudice or irrelevance—a “procedural 
bar”? 
A related question is how the law-of-the-case doctrine would work in the 
section 440 context.  Suppose a trial judge in the original criminal trial 
holds that a certain piece of evidence is inadmissible, and the defendant is 
convicted.  The defendant appeals the judgment of conviction, alleging, 
among other things, that the exclusion of evidence was wrongful, but his 
argument is rejected and his conviction affirmed.  Then the criminal 
defendant files a federal habeas petition, once again challenging, on federal 
constitutional grounds, the exclusion of the proffered evidence.  Once 
again, his argument is rejected.  Now, the defendant files an “actual 
innocence” claim pursuant to CPL section 440.10(h) and seeks to present 
the same piece of evidence before the section 440 court.  Can the court 
consider the evidence or is it bound by the earlier decisions that have held it 
inadmissible? 
The strong suggestion in Hamilton is that the rules of evidence do not 
apply, and the notion underlying the suggestion is that a proceeding to 
determine “actual innocence” is akin to an exercise of the court’s equitable 
jurisdiction.  It is not clear, however, why this should be so.  After all, the 
rules of evidence developed to ensure that only reliable evidence came 
before a finder of fact, and there is no obvious reason that the rules should 
not apply at a section 440 hearing. 
It is important to recognize that the questions of admissibility of evidence 
go both ways.  For example, what of incriminating evidence that was 
 
 72. See supra notes 9–11 and accompanying text (discussing prior applications of CPL 
section 440.10(1)(h)). 
 73. People v. Hamilton, 979 N.Y.S.2d 97, 109 (App. Div. 2014). 
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suppressed before the underlying criminal trial not because it was unreliable 
but for some other reason—for example, that a defendant was not read his 
Miranda rights, or a search warrant was defective?  Can the prosecution 
rely on that evidence at an actual innocence hearing, even though it was not 
entitled to rely on it at the underlying trial? 
C.   Should an Actual Innocence Claim Be Differently Analyzed 
Depending on Whether the Underlying Conviction 
Followed a Jury Trial or a Guilty Plea? 
Should a court’s ruling on a section 440.10(h) “actual innocence” petition 
depend in any way on whether the defendant was convicted pursuant to:  (a) 
a jury trial, (b) a bench trial, or (c) a guilty plea?  On the one hand, one 
might argue that how the defendant’s underlying conviction arose is 
irrelevant to the merits of her petition—an underlying conviction is an 
underlying conviction.  On the other hand, one might consider that a jury 
trial is the “gold standard” of criminal justice,74 and therefore a petition 
following a jury verdict of guilty should be especially hard to upend. 
Although this question has not been extensively litigated, it appears that 
most courts have held that they will not entertain actual innocence claims 
following guilty pleas.75  As one court explained: 
A major theoretical support for permitting an actual-innocence challenge 
is that the conviction of and incarceration of an innocent person offends 
due process.  But if that is so, where a defendant pleads guilty, any denial 
of due process is the result of his or her own doing.  It is difficult to 
perceive how one who has voluntarily and knowingly pleaded guilty to a 
crime has wrongly been denied due process.76 
It remains to be seen, however, whether a guilty plea would prevent any 
claim of innocence, or whether one who has pled guilty could still assert a 
gateway claim of innocence.  That is, might a defendant who has pled guilty 
 
 74. Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1398 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 75. See, e.g., State v. Westover, No. 2 CA-CR 2011-0319-PR, 2012 WL 432633, at *3 
(Ariz. Ct. App. Feb. 10, 2012); People v. Barnslater, 869 N.E.2d 293, 306 (Ill. App. Ct. 
2007) (“[W]e would strongly question whether a claim for relief under the Post-Conviction 
Hearing Act premised upon newly discovered evidence of actual innocence can suffice to 
raise a cognizable constitutional deprivation where the challenged conviction was entered 
pursuant to a plea of guilty.”); Norris v. State, 896 N.E.2d 1149, 1153 (Ind. 2008); Majors v. 
State, 946 So.2d 369, 374 (Miss. Ct. App. 2006) (“Majors cannot now claim that he has 
newly discovered evidence which would have ‘produced a different result’ because his guilty 
plea essentially nullifies any argument that there is some undiscovered evidence which could 
prove his innocence.”); People v. Cosey, No. 8131/97, slip op. at 25 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 20, 
2013) (absent extraordinary circumstances, a defendant’s guilty plea acts as a bar to an 
actual innocence hearing) (on file with the Fordham Law Review).  Some courts have 
allowed for petitions of actual innocence even following a guilty plea. See, e.g., Smith v. 
State, No. 58973, 2012 WL 765092, at *2 (Nev. Mar. 8, 2012); Ex parte Brown, 205 S.W.3d 
538 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (considering a claim of actual innocence following a guilty plea 
but rejecting the claim on the merits). 
 76. Cosey, No. 8131/97, slip op. at 25. 
12 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW RES GESTAE [Vol. 83 
be permitted to show her innocence and, if she succeeds in doing so, then 
attempt to show that her plea was somehow constitutionally defective?77 
D.   How Heavily Should the Court Weigh the Tardiness 
of the Application Against the Defendant? 
CPL section 440.10(1)(g) provides for the vacatur of a conviction where 
newly discovered evidence compels such a result.  The requirement that 
evidence be newly discovered serves an important purpose:  it prevents 
defendants from holding back evidence, or not searching diligently for 
evidence, in connection with their underlying criminal trial, and then 
presenting new evidence before another judge, seeking to get a new trial 
entirely—another bite at the apple. 
Hamilton would appear to suggest that the evidence that the defendant 
seeks to present pursuant to CPL section 440.10(1)(h) for her “actual 
innocence” claim need not be newly discovered.  But were that so, there 
would be no limit to the defendant getting such a second (or third, or fourth) 
bite at the apple.  At the very least, if the tardiness of the evidentiary 
showing is not a per se reason for rejecting the petition—as it would be 
were the petition sought pursuant to CPL section 440.10(1)(g)—the court 
should weigh the fact that a defendant’s evidence was not presented at the 
original trial very heavily against the defendant, unless the defendant can 
give a convincing reason that the evidence was not presented in a timely 
fashion. 
E.   Why Is the Remedy Dismissal of the Indictment? 
If the defendant prevails, Hamilton holds, then “the indictment should be 
dismissed pursuant to CPL [section] 440.10(4), which authorizes that 
disposition where appropriate.”78  It is important to recognize that the 
dismissal of an indictment is an extraordinary remedy.  The typical 
remedy—expressly recognized by CPL section 440.10(4) and (5)—where 
newly discovered evidence casts doubt on the integrity of the conviction is 
to vacate the judgment of conviction and set the case for a new trial.79  By 
vacating the conviction and allowing the case to be tried again, the court 
respects the roles of the grand jury (to indict), the prosecution (to present 
the case to a jury), and the jury (to determine, in light of all of the evidence 
whether the government has met its burden to prove guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt). 
The Hamilton court’s ruling that the remedy for an actual innocence 
claim is dismissal of the indictment is especially notable because—CPL 
section 440.10(6)—provides for dismissal of the indictment in a particular 
circumstance:  where the underlying conviction is for loitering for the 
 
 77. For example, the defendant suffered ineffective assistance of counsel, the 
defendant’s plea was coerced and thus involuntary, or the defendant did not understand her 
rights and thus the plea was not knowing. 
 78. People v. Hamilton, 979 N.Y.S.2d 97, 109 (App. Div. 2014). 
 79. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.10(4)–(5) (McKinney 2005). 
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purpose of engaging in prostitution or engaging in prostitution, and the 
defendant is the victim of a sex-trafficking crime.80  That provision makes 
perfect sense, because one who is a victim of sex trafficking should not be 
criminally responsible for engaging in prostitution.  The point, though, is 
that the legislature carefully distinguished between instances (the vast 
majority) in which a judgment must be vacated and the instance 
(prostitution by a sex-trafficking victim), where not only must the judgment 
be vacated, but the charging instrument must be dismissed as well.  The 
legislature did not provide for mandatory dismissal of the charging 
instrument where the defendant’s petition asserted an actual innocence 
claim under CPL section 440.10(1)(h). 
What justification is there for the extraordinary remedy of dismissal of 
the indictment?  The only explanation can be that the evidence presented to 
the court determining actual innocence is so overwhelming that it is clear 
that no juror could find that the defendant was guilty of the crime charged 
in the indictment, and that any prosecution would necessarily result in an 
order of dismissal.  And this makes sense:  if the evidence were such that 
the defendant could not be found guilty, then there is no reason to make him 
sit through the ordeal of a trial.  Dismissal of the indictment is the proper 
remedy. 
Almost.  There are at least two problems with the explanation.  The first 
is a practical one:  in many cases, it will be exceedingly difficult for the 
court to be confident that a juror could not find that the defendant was 
guilty.  There will be some cases where this standard is met.  DNA 
exonerations come immediately to mind, but after those, there are very few.  
If one were to take the standard seriously—and it must be taken seriously—
then any actual innocence motion that depends on an interested witness’s 
credibility would have to be denied because it is virtually impossible to say 
that every juror would believe the interested witness.  Yet, that is the 
standard that would have to be satisfied to dismiss the indictment. 
Furthermore, once again the evidentiary standard on actual innocence 
motions raises complications.  What if the court considering the actual 
innocence motion reaches its decision that the defendant has met his burden 
by relying on evidence that would be inadmissible at a criminal trial (again, 
think of the case of the codefendant’s confession that exonerates the 
defendant)?  The court cannot answer whether “any reasonable juror would 
vote to convict the defendant in light of this evidence” when the evidence 
that the court is considering could not be before the juror. 
The ultimate point is not merely a matter of evidentiary sleight of hand, 
but of the separation of power within the criminal justice system.  The 
actual innocence motion places the court in the place of the jury as the 
ultimate arbiter of guilt or innocence, and that is an extraordinary place for 
it to be.  One must not overstate the point, for it is not unprecedented for the 
court to determine innocence; that is precisely what a judgment of acquittal 
following a verdict is.  But such judgments following verdicts are rare.  
 
 80. See id. § 440.10(6). 
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Courts must take care that actual innocence judgments that result in the 
dismissal of indictments are rare, as well. 
F.   How Should the Court Weigh the Evidence 
That Was Presented at the Underlying Trial? 
According to Hamilton, a court hearing an actual innocence claim must 
weigh the evidence of actual innocence against the weight of guilt.  
Typically, that evidence will reside in the trial record (assume for the 
moment that the underlying conviction was obtained pursuant to a trial, not 
a plea).  Therefore a court hearing an actual innocence claim will 
presumably review the trial record, just as a court considering a newly 
discovered evidence claim does under CPL section 440.10(1)(g). 
This weighing of evidence presents unusual problems, however, because 
it pits a live witness or witnesses (testifying on the defendant’s behalf) 
against a cold, possibly very old, record.  How is a judge to compare live 
witnesses against witnesses whose demeanors she cannot see, whose tone 
she cannot hear?  It seems that the trial witnesses will be at a distinct 
disadvantage.  Indeed, it is not even clear how the court would go about 
assessing the weight of the evidence adduced at trial.  Would it consider the 
number of eyewitnesses?  Is the evidence stronger if there are three than if 
there is one?  Perhaps, but it would depend on the circumstances of their 
viewing and the clarity of their testimony.  Can the court consider how long 
it took the jury to reach a verdict?81  Is a fast verdict a sign that the evidence 
was strong, or that the jury was not diligent?  Is a longer deliberation a sign 
that the case was close, or that the jury was thorough?  Drawing any 
inferences from length of deliberation is probably unsound. 
Furthermore, there is a lower limit below which the court cannot go in 
assessing the evidence from the trial.  The evidence could not have been too 
weak, for it satisfied the proof beyond a reasonable doubt standard, which 
was presumably tested not only in the trial court but in the appellate courts 
as well.  Once again, the point is that unless actual innocence hearings are 
to be opportunities for the courts to usurp entirely the role of the juries, 
findings of actual innocence must be the rare exception rather than the rule. 
The problem of weighing the evidence is especially difficult when the 
underlying conviction is by a guilty plea.82  The evidentiary record in such 
a case consists solely of a plea allocution.  As Justice Scalia asked in a 
federal habeas case: 
[H]ow is the court to determine “actual innocence” . . . where conviction 
was based upon an admission of guilt?  Presumably, the defendant will 
introduce evidence (perhaps nothing more than his own testimony) 
showing that he did not “use” a firearm in committing the crime to which 
 
 81. See, e.g., People v. Bryant, 986 N.Y.S.2d 287, 289 (App. Div. 2014) (in granting 
motion based on actual innocence, court notes that the jury “deliberated for over 13 hours 
and, at one point, was deadlocked” implying that the length of deliberation and the 
deadlocking were the products of relatively weak evidence of guilt). 
 82. As noted above, many courts have refused to entertain claims of actual innocence 
following guilty pleas. See supra notes 74–75 and accompanying text. 
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he pleaded guilty, and the Government, eight years after the fact, will 
have to find and produce witnesses saying that he did.  This seems to me 
not to remedy a miscarriage of justice, but to produce one.83 
G.   What Must a Defendant Show 
to Be Entitled to an Evidentiary Hearing? 
Hamilton presumes that the defendant will file a petition with some 
evidence—typically in the form of affidavits—that, if truthful, would 
establish his innocence.  In Hamilton itself, for example, there were 
affidavits from witnesses who had not testified at Hamilton’s trial, averring 
to his alibi.84 
Plainly, if the claims in those affidavits were accepted as true, then 
Hamilton could not be guilty.  The question is thus presented:  When it is 
trying to determine whether to hold a hearing on the defendant’s actual 
innocence, must the trial court accept the affidavits as truthful?  If the court 
is required to accept the factual averments in the affidavits as truthful then it 
would appear that the court would have no choice but to order a hearing.  
The upshot will be that every case in which the defendant files a facially 
plausible claim of actual innocence will result in a hearing.  But that answer 
would likely lead to chaos because virtually every conviction in which the 
defendant receives a lengthy period of incarceration would result in 
protracted actual innocence hearings long after the conviction.  The 
criminal justice system would grind to a halt. 
So, how can a court decide whether a hearing is warranted?  Witnesses 
often recant their testimony, and the law is clear that such recantations are 
given slight weight by the courts.85  How can a court decide—based on 
affidavits only—whether a recantation is valid?  New witnesses, even 
biased ones, might be found to submit affidavits that support the 
defendant’s innocence—the new witness may “recall,” for example, that he 
was with the defendant at the time of the crime, or he overheard someone 
else admitting to the crime and exonerating the defendant, many years later.  
It is apparent that courts must apply some level of scrutiny to the affidavits 
that defendants will submit in their efforts to obtain an actual innocence 
hearing, but defining the level of scrutiny may prove to be a very difficult 
task. 
H.   Whither the Procedural Bars? 
Defendants are absolutely barred from asserting claims that they could 
have made—or that they made and lost—on appeal.86  Hamilton held that 
because the actual innocence claim was based on evidence that had not been 
 
 83. Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 631 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 84. See People v. Hamilton, 979 N.Y.S.2d 97, 100–01 (App. Div. 2014). 
 85. See, e.g., People v. Smalls, 894 N.Y.S.2d 791, 793 (App. Div. 2010) (“It is well 
established that recantation evidence is inherently unreliable . . . .” (internal quotation and 
citations omitted)). 
 86. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.10(2)(a), (c) (McKinney 2005); see also supra 
note 13 and accompanying text. 
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presented at trial, the claim could not have been asserted on direct appeal, 
and therefore these provisions did not apply.87  As to the discretionary bars 
of CPL section 440.10(3), the appellate court found that “there is no reason 
why the courts may not consider a credible claim of actual innocence in the 
exercise of discretion.”88 
But that leaves a question:  Could a trial court, in the exercise of its 
discretion, determine that the discretionary bars apply even to a claim of 
actual innocence?  In particular, one of the discretionary grounds on which 
a court might stand to deny a claim is that it was raised on a previous 
petition or could have been.89  Hamilton held that it was not an abuse of 
discretion for a court to hear a claim of actual innocence notwithstanding 
that the discretionary bars might apply.  It left open the question, however, 
whether it would be an abuse of the court’s discretion to refuse to hear such 
a claim where the discretionary bar applied. 
I.   Is There a Sound Basis 
for the “Clear and Convincing Evidence” Burden of Proof? 
Following the federal case law, and the cases from other states, Hamilton 
imposed the burden on the defendant to establish his actual innocence by 
“clear and convincing” evidence.90  The problem with that holding is that it 
contradicts express statutory language, for CPL section 440 is very clear:  
section 440.30(6) provides that on any collateral attack “the defendant has 
the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence every fact 
essential to support the motion.”91 
Hamilton notes CPL section 440.30(6) but summarily distinguished it, 
stating that while that section applied a preponderance of the evidence 
standard, “with respect to a claim of actual innocence, as distinguished from 
a specific constitutional violation, a constitutional violation occurs only if 
there is clear and convincing evidence that the defendant is innocent.”92  In 
support, the court cited authority from other states or the opinions of trial 
level courts in New York.93  The authority for the proposition is therefore 
still unclear. 
CONCLUSION 
Actual innocence is hard to resist.  It is impossible not to feel outraged on 
behalf of those who are shown, indisputably, to have been wrongly 
convicted.  DNA exonerations are blessings to justice. 
And yet there must be finality to our system of criminal justice.  
Convictions must be final sometime.  To allow extensive relitigation would 
 
 87. See Hamilton, 979 N.Y.S.2d at 103–04; see also supra note 29 and accompanying 
text. 
 88. Hamilton, 979 N.Y.S.2d at 104. 
 89. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.10(3)(b)–(c). 
 90. See Hamilton, 979 N.Y.S.2d at 105, 109. 
 91. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.30(6). 
 92. Hamilton, 979 N.Y.S.2d at 108. 
 93. Id. (citing cases). 
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permit meritless claims to prevail, gaining strength as the passage of time 
erodes the truth, as witnesses die or their memories fade, as documents and 
evidence are lost or degraded.  To allow such relitigation would also 
demean the guilty pleas and trials on which we all depend to resolve 
criminal cases. 
Hamilton was doubtless well motivated—by the desire that an innocent 
man not be convicted of a crime.  But closer examination of the broad 
generalities reveals the complications:  that in most cases (DNA 
exonerations being an exception), we do not know with certainty what 
happened at the scene of the crime; that we can usually only draw 
inferences based on the evidence; that drawing such inferences is exactly 
what we ask juries to do; that unless evidence of innocence is newly 
discovered and could not reasonably have been discovered at the time of the 
defendant’s trial, then a court’s consideration of such evidence will 
inevitably undermine the validity of the jury’s verdict—and ultimately, of 
the jury system itself.  What is the point of a jury trial if a judge can look at 
evidence that could have been made available to the jury and make her own 
decision, contrary to what the jury decided? 
Not only does Hamilton upset the balance between judges and juries, and 
deeply affect questions of finality, but it also challenges standard 
understandings of the separation of powers between the legislature and the 
courts.  New York’s collateral review statute is very detailed.94  It does not 
have an actual innocence provision.  That is not an oversight:  as Hamilton 
notes, there was legislation pending in New York State at the time of the 
decision that would have specifically provided for actual innocence 
collateral attacks on judgments of conviction.95  That proposed legislation 
would have provided for certain terms that Hamilton itself imposed (proof 
by clear and convincing evidence, and the remedy of outright dismissal of 
the accusatory instrument, rather than vacatur and remand for a new trial).96  
But the law was not enacted.  Hamilton thus did judicially what the state did 
not do legislatively. 
Whether Hamilton becomes a runaway train or a narrow exception to the 
finality of jury verdicts depends, in part, on the answers to the questions 
posed above, and doubtless others. 
 
 94. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.10–.70. 
 95. See Hamilton, 979 N.Y.S.2d at 107 n.4; see also S.B. 49A, 2013 Sen., Reg. Sess. 
(N.Y. 2013), available at http://open.nysenate.gov/legislation/bill/S49A-2013. 
 96. See S.B. 49A. 
